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ANCSA CORPORATION PROXY
WARS
AARON M. SCHUTT*
ABSTRACT
When Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971
(ANCSA), it directed the creation of twelve regional and over two hundred
village corporations chartered under Alaska state law. The Act made
governance of those corporations largely subject to Alaska state law, including
the laws and regulations applicable to corporate elections. This Article reviews
the legal history of the corporate proxy wars and related election issues that the
ANCSA corporations and candidates for their boards of directors have waged
over the past nearly fifty years in proxy complaints filed with the Alaska
Division of Securities, and in state and federal courts. These cases have had
important implications for ANCSA corporations, including enormous
financial burdens associated with the litigation and impacting who has led
ANCSA corporations.

I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska Native Corporation annual board elections occasionally
produce news headlines like: “Battle Over CIRI Proxies Leads to a
Countersuit”;1 “Chugach Troubled by Board Unrest”;2 and, “Court
Filings Expose Power Struggle Over Sex Harassment at Alaska Native
Corporation Calista.”3 The Calista case was one of the latest iterations of
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1. Elizabeth Bluemink, Battle Over CIRI Proxies Leads to a Countersuit,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 29, 2008, at A3.
2. Paula Dobbyn, Chugach Troubled by Board Unrest, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 19, 2004, at F1.
3. Nathaniel Herz, Court Filings Expose Power Struggle Over Sex Harassment
Charges at Alaska Native Corporation Calista, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2018),
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/rural-alaska/2018/06/07/court-filingsexpose-power-struggle-over-sex-harassment-charges-at-native-corporationcalista/.
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a proxy war4 in the annual election cycle of an Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act5 (ANCSA or the “Act”) corporation during the fifty years
since passage of the Act.
Congress, for the first time in its several hundred years of federal
Indian policy, chose a corporate model to complete a settlement of
aboriginal land claims in Alaska: “The first idea of Native corporations
was presented to Congress for the first time in January, 1968, in a report
of the Governor’s Task Force on Native Land Claims.”6 In choosing a
corporate model, Congress largely delegated authority to regulate the
corporate governance of the soon-to-be-created Alaska Native
Corporations to the state of Alaska; it also retained some initial and longterm federal oversight.7 Importantly, the ANCSA corporate model differs
from other state-chartered corporations in that, among other things: each
original shareholder had to be born before December 18, 1971;8 each
shareholder had to be at least one-quarter Alaska Native,9 with a thencurrent or historic tie to a specific region of Alaska;10 each shareholder
received one hundred shares of stock that was not saleable and had
limited ability to be transferred;11 and, the board of directors of each
4. A proxy is “[s]omeone who is authorized to act as a substitute for another;
esp., in corporate law, a person who is authorized to vote another’s stock shares.”
Proxy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). A “proxy contest” is a “struggle
between two corporate factions to obtain the votes of uncommitted shareholders.”
Proxy contest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
5. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h).
6. Kornelia Grabinska, TANANA CHIEFS CONF., INC., Native Corporations
Statutes and Practice, in 2 INTERIOR REGION POST ANCSA IMPACT ANALYSIS, Sec. I at
1 (1983).
7. H.R. REP. NO. 94-729, at 20 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2386–
87; Opinion and Ord., Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp., No. 3AN-80-8227, at 7
(Alaska Sup. Ct. Dec. 26, 1980) (“A review of the House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 94729 . . . demonstrates that Congress intended native corporation securities
transactions to be governed by Alaska law.”).
8. See 43 U.S.C. §1604(a) (“The Secretary shall prepare within two years
from December 18, 1971, a roll of all Natives who were born on or before, and who
are living on, December 18, 1971.”).
9. See id. § 1604(a) (“The Secretary shall prepare within two years
from December 18, 1971, a roll of all Natives . . . .”); § 1602(b) (“‘Native’ means a
citizen of the United States who is a person of one-fourth degree or more Alaska
Indian (including Tsimshian Indians not enrolled in the Metlaktla Indian
Community) Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or combination thereof.”).
10. See id. § 1606(a) (“For purposes of this chapter, the State of Alaska shall be
divided . . . into twelve geographic regions, with each region composed as far as
practicable of Natives having a common heritage and sharing common
interests.”).
11. See id. § 1606(g)(1)(A) (“The Regional Corporation shall be authorized to
issue such number of shares of Settlement Common Stock . . . as may be needed
to issue one hundred shares of stock to each Native enrolled in the region . . . .”);
§ 1606(h)(1)(B) (listing restrictions on sale or alienation).
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ANCSA corporation is comprised of shareholders of the corporation.12
Several of these factors also contribute to the dynamics surrounding
ANCSA corporation board elections and proxy contests, especially the
evenly-dispersed nature of stock ownership in ANCSA corporations.
Congress addressed several corporate governance topics in
ANCSA,13 but it left the regulation of ANCSA corporation annual
elections, including the regulation of corporate proxies, to the state of
Alaska. The Alaska Supreme Court has summarized the state of the law:
“To the extent that the shareholders’ claims are not directly governed by
ANCSA, then, they are controlled by Alaska law rather than federal
securities law.”14 The court further noted that “interpretations of relevant
SEC and federal common law prohibitions . . . provide a ‘useful guide’ in
interpreting similar securities issues arising under state law in ANCSA
cases.”15 Congress expected that Alaska courts would consider SEC
precedent:
[T]he Committee understands that the general provisions of
Alaska law provide protection for Native stockholders from any
corporate mismanagement and misrepresentations or omissions
to represent in connection with sales of securities, and that
Alaska courts would look to precedents under federal securities
laws for appropriate standards of conduct by management and
other persons connected with securities transactions.16
Following the passage of ANCSA in December 1971, the Alaska
Legislature quickly enacted statutes governing ANCSA corporations,
including board elections.17 In 1977, the Alaska legislature passed a law
12. See id. § 1606(f) (“The management of the Regional Corporation shall be
vested in a board of directors, all of whom, with the exception of the initial board,
shall be stockholders . . . .”).
13. See, e.g., id. § 1606(o) (requiring regional corporations to conduct annual
audits performed by independent certified public accountants); § 1625(c)
(requiring Native corporations to provide annual reports to shareholders); § 1627
(regulating mergers of Native corporations); § 1629(b)–(c) (establishing
procedures for considering certain amendments and resolutions).
14. Skaflestad v. Huna Totem Corp., 76 P.3d 391, 395 (Alaska 2003). ANCSA
specifically exempts ANCs from compliance with certain federal securities laws.
See 43 U.S.C. § 1625(a); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-121,
REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS: STATUS 40 YEARS AFTER ESTABLISHMENT,
AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS, 8 (2012) [hereinafter GAO-13-121].
15. Skaflestad, 76 P.3d at 395 (quoting Brown v. Ward, 593 P.2d 247, 249
(Alaska 1979)).
16. H.R. REP. NO. 94-729, at 20 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2386.
17. See An Act Implementing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act § 1,
1972 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70, 1 (“It is the purpose of this Act to implement the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (P.L. 92-203; 85 Stat. 688) by amending state
law to resolve those ambiguities, conflicts and problems directly or impliedly
created by the enactment by Congress . . . . It is also the purpose of this Act to
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requiring ANCSA corporations with “at least 30 Alaska resident
shareholders[,] . . . total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity
security held of record by 500 or more persons” to file a “copy of all
annual reports, proxies, consents or authorizations, proxy statements and
other materials relating to proxy solicitations” with the state Division of
Banking and Securities.18 But the state did not immediately promulgate
regulations implementing the statutes it adopted.
Congress’s hope to minimize litigation, expressly stated in
ANCSA,19 was not realized. ANCSA corporations heavily litigated land
selections20 and ANCSA Section 7(i)—the unique natural resource
revenue sharing provision included in ANCSA21—for the first twenty
years following the Act’s passage. They and their shareholders—perhaps,
in part, because of their frequent interaction with attorneys—also learned
complement through state policy . . . the federal policy expressed in that Act.”).
18. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.139 (2021). The statute was originally enacted as § 1,
ch. 58 Session Laws of Alaska 1977. Act effective May 27, 1977, § 1, 1977 Alaska
Sess. Laws ch. 58, 1. The legislature made a minor amendment in 2017. See Act
effective July 1, 2017, § 49, 2017 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 3, 31 (amending the statute
to use the term “which” instead of “that”).
19. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (“[T]he settlement should be accomplished rapidly,
with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives,
without litigation . . . .”).
20. The land selection litigation included cases between the regional
corporations, between regional corporations and the United States, and between
regional corporations and the State of Alaska. E.g., Cent. Council of the Tlingit &
Haida Indians of Alaska v. Chugach Native Ass’n, 502 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1974)
(discussing boundary disputes between regional corporations); Seldovia Native
Ass’n, Inc., 84 Interior Dec. 349, 359 (1977) (appealing an ANCSA § 14(a) decision);
see also James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act at 35: Delivering
on the Promise, in 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 12, at 50–51 (2007) (“Like so many
other provisions of ANCSA, the land withdrawal, selection, and conveyance
provisions were complex, ambiguous, and heavily litigated. Much of this
litigation was brought by the State of Alaska.”).
21. E.g., Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978)
(discussing a dispute between two regional corporations over formula for
distributing Alaska Native fund); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 410 F.
Supp. 1196 (D. Alaska 1976) (discussing case involving all twelve regional
corporations regarding ANCSA § 7(i)); see also GAO-13-121, supra note 14, at 6 n.10
(“The 7(i) distribution was the subject of much litigation in the 1970s . . . .”);
Michael J. Walleri, TANANA CHIEFS CONF., INC., Post-ANCSA Litigation, in 2
INTERIOR REGION POST ANSCA IMPACT ANALYSIS, § XIII, at 8 (1983) (“The most
litigation regarding implementation of ANCSA by the Native corporations has
been in the area of ‘revenue sharing.’ ‘Revenue sharing’ refers to a system
established by 43 USC 1606 [sic] for the sharing of income from settlement assets
between Native corporations.”); Ethan G. Schutt & Aaron M. Schutt, The Grand
Compromise: The ANCSA Section 7(I) Settlement Agreement, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 201,
228–33 (2017) (reviewing settlement agreement resulting from
Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 410 F.2d 1196 (D. Alaska 1976)); Aaron M.
Schutt, ANCSA Section 7(I): $40 Million Per Word and Counting, 33 ALASKA L. REV.
229, 242–53 (2016) (reviewing the history of ANCSA § 7(i)).
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to fight proxy wars that often involved litigation in the first few years after
the creation of ANCSA corporations.22 Those proxy wars have arisen
intermittently from the early days of ANCSA to the present.
Each year, more than two hundred ANCSA corporations must hold
annual elections for their boards of directors. Sometimes ANCSA
corporation annual meetings also involve other important corporate
decisions put to a shareholder vote, such as creating an ANCSA
settlement trust23 or issuing new shares to ANCSA corporation
descendants.24 Proxy wars have impacted various ANCSA corporations’
elections many times over the past fifty years; they have at times caused
corporate leadership uncertainty during and following the elections, and
once even left an ANCSA regional corporation in “near financial ruin.”25
This Article shares that part of the ANCSA story.

II. THE PROXY WAR CASES
This Part will examine the various subjects of controversy and
litigation regarding ANCSA proxies. While proxy fights cover almost the
entire fifty-year history of ANCSA corporations, a notable pattern
emerged caused in part by the State of Alaska’s slow pace in updating
regulations regarding proxy solicitation in the digital age of social media
and other electronic media used by candidates in corporate elections. In
addition, two emerging issues in ANCSA proxy wars include the
discomfort some shareholders hold regarding the use of discretionary or
undirected proxies26 in corporate elections and the interaction between
22. Another possible cause of some of the early litigation was the state’s delay
in promulgating regulations regarding proxy solicitations for ANCSA
corporations.
23. See 43 U.S.C. § 1629e (allowing ANCSA corporations to create settlement
trusts through “approval of the shareholders” to “promote the health, education,
and welfare of its beneficiaries and preserve the heritage and culture of Natives”).
24. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(1)(B)(i)(I) (allowing ANCSA corporations to issue
“additional shares of Settlement Common Stock to Natives born after December
18, 1971,” by amending its articles of incorporation); id. § 1629b(b) (outlining
procedure for amending articles of incorporation).
25. Cathy Brown, Lawyers and More Lawyers, ALASKA HUMANS. F.: ALASKA
HIST. & CULTURAL STUD., http://www.akhistorycourse.org/modernalaska/between-worlds-lawyers-and-more-lawyers/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2022).
26. See, e.g., Ahmasuk v. State, 478 P.3d 665, 669 (Alaska 2021) (“Discretionary
proxy voting in director elections has been the subject of Sitnasuak shareholder
debate for at least the last few years.”). Discretionary proxies allow the named
proxyholder the discretion to vote for the candidate of their choice, rather than
the shareholder directing the proxyholder to vote for a particular candidate. Id. at
668 (“[A] proxy form may provide for a shareholder to grant the proxy holder the
same discretionary cumulative voting authority held by the shareholder.”).
However, some ANCSA corporation shareholders feel strongly that discretionary
proxies should not be permitted. See id. at 670 (“I believe SNC shareholders are
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proxy regulations and the First Amendment.27 Before exploring these
recent issues in more detail, however, the following Section will detail an
earlier and ongoing issue at the heart of the proxy wars: false and
misleading information within proxy solicitations.
A. False and Misleading Proxy Cases
In Brown v. Ward,28 the Alaska Supreme Court for the first time
addressed the question of whether a candidate for an Alaska Native
regional corporation board gained shareholder proxies through
materially misleading representations in the 1977 Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
(CIRI) board election. There, Ward, a candidate for the CIRI board of
directors, issued two proxy solicitations to CIRI shareholders, the second
of which asserted that CIRI “could presently give each shareholder ‘a big
chunk of land[,]’ . . . that the corporation could sell coal reserves and
receive $300,000.00 for each shareholder . . . [and] that thousands of
dollars in cash could be distributed to each shareholder if the real estate
investments of the corporation were liquidated.”29 Three board
candidates intervened in the litigation and appealed a superior court
decision in favor of Ward.30
The court began its analysis by noting that “[w]hen Ward requested
the proxies there existed no Alaska statute prohibiting false statements in
proxy solicitations.”31 The court then turned to the common law and
federal law regarding proxies, which “both prohibit material falsehoods,”
and noted the precedents “are a useful guide in determining when a
misstatement is material under Alaska common law.”32 The court noted
that a “misrepresentation is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote.”33 The court further held that “[s]ubjective proof that one or

realizing that discretionary proxies are harmful to our election process and are
realizing in greater numbers such practices are disrespectful to our traditions.”
(quoting Letter to Ed., Nome Nugget (Feb. 9, 2017))).
27. See, e.g., Ahmasuk, 478 P.3d at 678 n.59 (“If the line between lawful proxy
solicitation regulation and unlawful infringement of free speech is left unclear,
then the regulation also fails to give fair notice of what conduct is required and
prohibited.”); Calista Corp. v. Don, No. 3AN-18-6788, 1–2 (Alaska Super. Ct. 3d
Dist. June 4, 2018) (“[T]he relief sought . . . amounts to a ‘gag’ order or prior
restraint on their right to discuss matters of public interest and corporate
governance.”).
28. 593 P.2d 247, 248 (Alaska 1979).
29. Id. at 249.
30. Id. at 248.
31. Id. at 249.
32. Id. at 250.
33. Id.
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more shareholders actually granted a proxy because of a falsehood is not
required.”34
Turning to the proxy statements made by Ward, the court held that
it was “beyond argument that the [Ward proxy statement]
misrepresented [the] ability of Cook Inlet to distribute money or land to
shareholders on the scale expressed in the solicitation” and that it “would
be likely to influence shareholders to grant proxies to Ward.”35 Finding
the proxy solicitations to be materially false as a matter of law, the court
held that the trial court need not hear further evidence on the matter.36
Through its decision in Ward, the court laid the foundation for analysis of
the issue of false and misleading proxies for the decades that followed.
Following the Ward case, the State of Alaska began to address the
lack of regulations regarding proxy statements. The state first
promulgated regulations in 1981, several of which “apply only to
corporations organized under AS 10.06 and 43 U.S.C. [sections] 1601 –
1629h (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act) and subject to the
requirements of AS 45.55.139.”37
Alaska Statutes section 45.55.160 and its implementing regulations
prohibit false or misleading statements.38 The regulations require proxy
solicitations to disclose certain information.39 Barring certain exceptions,40
ANCSA board solicitations “must be preceded or accompanied by the
annual report for the corporation’s last fiscal year,” and a proxy statement
that includes information about each nominee included in the board’s
proxy solicitation.41
Alaska regulations define a “proxy” as “a written authorization

34. Id.
35. Id. at 251.
36. Id.
37. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.305 (2016); see State of Alaska, Dep’t of
Com. & Econ. Dev., Notice of Proposed Changes in Regulations of the Department
of Commerce and Economic Development (proposed Aug. 13, 1980) (to be
codified at ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.305 (2016)) (Arnold “Ole” Olsen
papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Libr., Univ. of Alaska
Anchorage) (on file with Author) (describing the proposed amendments to the
administrative code).
38. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.160 (2021) (“A person may not, in a document filed
with the administrator or in a proceeding under this chapter, make or cause to be
made an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading.”); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §
08.315 (2021) (implementing regulation). Section 08.315 was adopted in 1981 and
has been amended twice since then, in 1988 and 2013.
39. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.335 (2021) (establishing requirements as
to proxy).
40. Id. § 08.345(a).
41. Id. § 08.345(b)(1).
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which may take the form of a consent, revocation of authority, or failure
to act or dissent, signed by a shareholder or his attorney-in-fact and giving
another person power to vote with respect to the shares of the
shareholder.”42
The regulations define the “solicitation” of a proxy as follows:
(A) a request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke a proxy;
or
(B) the distributing of a proxy or other communication
to shareholders under circumstances reasonably calculated to
result in the procurement, withholding, or revocation of a proxy
. . . .43
The Alaska Administrative Code requires ANCSA corporation board
proxy solicitations44 and non-board proxy solicitations45 to disclose
certain information to shareholders.
In 2013, well into the digital age, Alaska updated the proxy
regulations to address the use of electronic forums and social media. The
new regulations require that electronic solicitations be filed with the
administrator consistent with Alaska Statutes section 45.55.139 and the
Alaska Administrative Code.46
The state’s promulgation of its first proxy regulations in 1981
occurred, coincidentally, just as the biggest proxy fight in Alaska history
was starting.
1. The Koniag Cases
In 1980, Koniag attempted to merge with six of the village
corporations in its region in a proposed share-for-share merger
transaction.47 A petition for review to the Alaska Supreme Court briefly
summarized this effort as follows:
A plan of merger was drafted in the spring of 1980 and had been
approved by the boards of all the participating village
corporations by the fall . . . . A joint proxy statement soliciting
proxies in favor of merger was sent to all shareholders in early
November, 1980. The merger vote was taken at the annual
42. Id. § 08.365(12).
43. Id. § 08.365(16) (emphasis added).
44. See id. § 08.345 (establishing the requirements for board solicitations).
45. See id. § 08.355 (establishing the requirements for non-board solicitations).
46. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.312 (2013).
47. Memorandum from Wilson L. Condon, Att’y Gen., State of Alaska, to
Julius J. Brecht, Dir., Div. of Banking & Sec., Dep’t. of Com. & Econ. Dev. 1 (Jan.
23, 1981) (Arnold “Ole” Olsen papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium
Libr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage) (on file with author) [hereinafter Condon
Memorandum].
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meetings of the merging corporations in early December, 1980.48
This proposed merger led to numerous separate, but related, lawsuits and
administrative actions regarding various issues, including whether the
joint proxy statement was “tainted by false statements of material fact . . .
or omission of statements of material fact.”49 Years later, a published
special report entitled “Lawyers and More Lawyers” summarized the
legal bills: “$2.5 million, more than a tenth of the entire $24 million Koniag
had received” through ANCSA, a sum that left Koniag “near financial
ruin.”50
On December 2, 1980, Arnold Olsen, a shareholder of both Koniag
and Afognak Native Corporation, filed the first suit in Alaska Superior
Court to enjoin the merger of Koniag and Afognak.51 Olsen alleged that
the “Joint Proxy Statement” issued by Koniag and the six village
corporations “misrepresent[ed] facts, omit[ted] facts and ma[de]
misleading statements which a reasonable shareholder would consider
important in deciding how to vote on the proposed merger.”52 In an
affidavit, Mr. Olsen outlined several areas of the proxy he alleged were
false or misleading, including “the promise that $2,100.00 will be
distributed to shareholders of Afognak if the merger is consummated . . .
[and] that ten acres of land will be distributed to shareholders if the
merger is approved.”53 Mr. Olsen further stated that “[t]he most
egregious aspect of the [Joint Proxy Statement] is its failure to discuss in
any substantive respect the value of the assets held by Afognak Native
Corporation and how that value compares to the assets of the other village
corporations which would be merged into the regional corporation.”54
48. Petition for Review at 3–4, Duncan v. Olsen, No. 7517 (Alaska, Feb. 17,
1983) (Arnold “Ole” Olsen papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium
Libr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage) (on file with author).
49. Condon Memorandum, supra note 47, at 2; see Memorandum of
Defendant Koniag, Inc. to Alaska Sup. Ct. 1 (Aug. 11, 1982) (“There are three
actions presently pending in this judicial district challenging the propriety of the
same proxy materials . . . . These cases are Olsen v. Afognak Native Corporation, et
al., Case No. 3AN-80-8227 Civ., Shuravloff v. Koniag, Inc., et al., Case No. 3AN-818353 Civ., and Eluska v. Koniag, Inc., et al., Case No. 3AN-82-4218 Civ.”); see also
Complaint, Peterson v. Koniag, Inc., No. 3AN-82-5673 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1982);
Complaint, Olsen v. Morse, No. 3AN-81-3721 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. 1981);
Judgment, Afognak Native Corp. v. Olsen, No. 3AN-81-3358 Civ. (Alaska Super.
Ct. 1981); Complaint, Koniag, Inc. v. Olsen, No. 3AN-81-3285 Civ. (Alaska Super.
Ct. 1981).
50. Brown, supra note 25.
51. Complaint at ¶¶ 30–31, Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp., No. 3AN-80-8227
(Alaska Super. Ct. 1980) (on file with author).
52. Id. ¶ 17.
53. Affidavit of Arnold A. Olsen at 2–3, Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp., No.
3AN-80-8227 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1980).
54. Id. at 6.

39.1 SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE)

58

5/2/2022 5:53 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 39:1

By the end of December 1980, the Superior Court had issued an order
enjoining the merger “pending determination of this action.”55 The court
specifically concluded that “there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider the misrepresentation that $2,100
and ten acres of land would be distributed only if merger occurred
important in deciding how to vote.”56
On December 3, 1980, a day after he filed the first court case, Arnold
Olsen also petitioned Julius Brecht, the Director of the Alaska Division of
Banking and Securities, to intervene and stop the proposed merger.57 This
request resulted in parallel processes in the Alaska courts and at the
Division of Banking and Securities and caused Director Brecht to seek the
advice of the Alaska Attorney General as to the “authority and the
procedure by which [the Division] might intervene to forestall [a
proposed] merger.”58 The Attorney General reviewed the interaction
between the Alaska Securities Act, Alaska Statutes section 45.55, and the
Alaska Business Corporation Act, Alaska Statutes section 10.07, before
informing Mr. Brecht that while the Division had the “jurisdiction and
authority to restrain false and misleading statements in a proxy
statement, it is not clear that [the Division] may administratively restrain
implementation of a merger.”59
A month after receiving the advice from the Attorney General, the
Commissioner moved to intervene in the Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp.
action.60 The court later denied the motion to intervene.61
The parties engaged in motions practice over many discovery issues
in 1981.62 By September of that year, the court had resolved many of these
questions.63
In 1982, Koniag and its shareholders were still waging proxy wars.
The Division of Banking and Securities addressed a complaint by Koniag
regarding “proxy statements disseminated to shareholders of Koniag,
55. Opinion and Ord. at 10, Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp., No. 3AN-80-8227
(Alaska Super. Ct. 1980).
56. Id. at 8.
57. Condon Memorandum, supra note 47, at 1.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Complaint in Intervention, Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp., No. 3AN-808227 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1981).
61. Ord. Denying Intervention, Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp., No. 3AN-808227 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1981).
62. Memorandum Decision and Ord. Granting in Part Defendants’ Motion
for Protective Ord., Olsen v. Afognak Native Corp., No. 3AN-80-8227 (Alaska
Super. Ct. 1981) (regarding issues such as shareholder rights to inspect and copy
corporate books and records and the defendants’ motion for a protective order
regarding same).
63. Id. at 2–10.
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Inc.” by three former directors and the question of “whether or not [those]
proxy statements . . . contained untrue statements of material fact.”64 The
Administrator held a two-day hearing in Kodiak in June 1982 before
making findings that there were many examples of false or misleading
statements included in the proxy statements.65 The hearing was
contentious and the Securities Division instructed both Koniag and its
former directors “to issue no more proxy statements to shareholders until
the Securities Division . . . has a chance to determine the accuracy of
previous statements.”66 An example of a statement that the Division
found to be false was “Koniag had experienced cumulative losses of
approximately $21 million . . . .” when the “accumulated loss [wa]s
approximately $4.1 million.”67 The litigation finally ended in January
1984, when:
an Anchorage jury found that J.F. Morse, who had by then
resigned as president, had indeed misled village shareholders
about the value of their land. The jury also found that the law
firm of Duncan, Weinberg, Miller & Hensley aided him [and] the
attorneys’ negligence had hurt the corporation financially.68
The jury found the lawyers and former Koniag directors liable for
$600,000 in damages;69 Alaska’s biggest proxy war had almost
bankrupted an Alaska Native regional corporation.70
Many years after the multiple Koniag cases that began in 1980,
Koniag again found itself in litigation over proxies. In Koniag, Inc. v.
Pagano,71 the Alaska Superior Court addressed the topic of false and
misleading non-board proxy solicitation under state proxy regulations.
The dispute revolved around three documents: “an April 1997 letter from
Koniag’s former president, Frank Pagano, to Koniag shareholders”; the
64. Certain Proxy Materials Distributed to Shareholders of Koniag, Inc.,
Order No. 83-09-S (Alaska Dep’t of Com., Cmty., & Econ. Dev., July 9, 1982),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/dbs/enforcementorders.aspx
[hereinafter Ord. No. 83-09-S].
65. Id. at 3–12. See also Craig Bartlett, State Officials Hear Koniag Complaints,
KODIAK DAILY MIRROR, June 3, 1982, at 1–2 (Arnold “Ole” Olsen papers, Archives
& Special Collections, Consortium Libr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage) (on file with
author).
66. Craig Bartlett, Official Puts Gag on Koniag Dispute, KODIAK DAILY MIRROR,
June 4, 1982, at 2 (Arnold “Ole” Olsen papers, Archives & Special Collections,
Consortium Libr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage) (on file with author).
67. Ord. No. 83-09-S, supra note 64, at 8.
68. Brown, supra note 25.
69. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Perry Eaton, Dir. (Retired), Koniag,
Inc. (Nov. 28, 2021).
70. Telephone Interview with Perry Eaton, Dir. (Retired), Koniag, Inc. (Nov.
28, 2021).
71. No. 3AN-97-10079 CI, 1999 WL 34793398 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1999).
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defendants’ “1997 proxy solicitation, which sought votes for the
December 1997 Koniag annual meeting”; and “a document . . . entitled,
‘What Every Shareholder Should Know,’ which was distributed by
Defendants at a Koniag shareholder informational meeting in
Anchorage.”72
The court first addressed the question of whether the April 1997
letter qualified as a proxy statement under the third title of Alaska
Administrative Code section 08.365(14).73 The court decided it was a
proxy statement after noting that the defendants’ November proxy
solicitation referenced the letter “indicat[ing] that [the letter] was sent to
Koniag shareholders as part of the execution of Defendants’ proxy
solicitation campaign and was calculated to influence Koniag
shareholders’ proxy votes for the November election.”74
Turning to the question of whether any of the statements were false
and misleading, the court ruled that in order to create a disputed issue of
material fact, “[d]efendants must set forth actual facts, not conclusory
statements.”75 Referencing Alaska Statutes section 45.55.160, the court
noted that “a single material statement or omission of fact is sufficient to
establish a violation of the statute.”76
The court next addressed the materiality of the false and misleading
statements. The court found that the statements were “obviously
important to Koniag shareholders in deciding how to vote their
proxies.”77
The Pagano court also addressed the requirements of title three of
Alaska Administrative Code section 08.355—proxy disclosure
requirements for non-board proxy solicitations.78 The court found that
Pagano’s proxy solicitation “did not comply with these disclosure
requirements” because the solicitation lacked a “statement of the total
amount estimated to be spent and the total amount already expended on
the solicitation of proxies” as well as “a statement indicating who will
bear the expense of the solicitation.”79
In Meidinger v. Koniag, Inc.,80 the Alaska Supreme Court again
addressed false and misleading proxy statements in the context of
Koniag’s annual election and the corporation’s proposal to create an

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at *1–2.
See id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *3–4.
Id. at *7.
See id. at *8.
Id. (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.355(8), (9) (2021)).
31 P.3d 77 (Alaska 2001).
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ANCSA settlement trust.81 Koniag sued three candidates, the Meidinger
slate, alleging that the slate had made “materially false or misleading
proxy solicitation statements” regarding the settlement trust proposal.82
The superior court granted Koniag summary judgment with regard to
two statements made by the Meidinger slate. The first claimed that the
settlement trust proposal gave the Koniag Board “way more power than
they currently possess” and the second that “the proposal also grants
irrevocable delegation from the shareholders to the current board to
appoint and remove trustees.”83
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.84 The court noted that
provisions of the trust agreement directly contradicted the Meidinger
slate’s statement that the Koniag board could “change the terms of the
trust and the number of trustees ‘as they see fit.’”85
With regard to the second statement, the court noted that the
provision of ANCSA that allows the creation of ANCSA settlement trusts
“grants Native corporations exclusive authority to appoint and remove
trustees of a settlement trust” and that shareholders do not have that
authority.86 The court concluded that the Meidinger slate’s statement to
the contrary was untrue as a matter of law.87 The court also rejected
Meidinger’s argument that Koniag’s proxy materials, mixed with the
Meidinger proxy statements, created a triable issue of fact as to the
materiality of the false statements.88 The court quoted the United States
Supreme Court: “[N]ot every mixture with the true will neutralize the
deceptive.”89 The court noted that “Koniag’s shareholders cannot be
expected to interpret and understand the terms of a trust proposal that
even Meidinger’s brief describe[d] as ‘complex.’”90
2. The Chugach Cases
The 2004 annual election for the Chugach Alaska Corporation’s
81. Id. at 81. Congress authorized ANCSA corporations to create settlement
trusts to “promote the health, education, and welfare of its beneficiaries and
preserve the heritage and culture of Natives.” 43 U.S.C. § 1629e. Settlement trusts
offer ANCSA corporations and the trust beneficiaries advantages including tax
advantages on distributions and creditor protections for assets. See Bruce N.
Edwards, The 2017 Tax Act and Settlement Trusts, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 1–34 (2018)
(reviewing law regarding ANCSA settlement trusts following the 2017 Tax Act).
82. Meidinger, 31 P.3d at 81.
83. Id. at 82.
84. Id. at 81.
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id. at 84 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(2)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,
501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991)).
90. Id.
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board of directors spawned a pair of dueling Alaska state court cases
involving the corporation and its then chairman with election proxy
materials at issue.91 Local press summarized the situation: “With a
corporate election five days away and with dueling complaints pending
before state regulators, Chugach Alaska Corp. held a turbulent
emergency board meeting on Monday where shareholders shouted down
an attempt to delay the vote.”92
The first case was Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp.,93 in which the
Alaska Supreme Court heard an appeal from the corporation’s lawsuit
against one of its directors alleging misconduct during his time as the
board chairman.94 One of the six alleged areas of misconduct involved
“authoriz[ing] a false and misleading proxy solicitation letter to
encourage the election of directors who would protect his position as
board chair.”95 This proxy issue focused on a “late-bird letter” that
Henrichs had directed the corporation send to shareholders during its
election cycle.96 The letter included a statement that “‘[t]he corporation
has filed a formal complaint with the State Division of Banking, Securities
and Corporations concerning a non-board [proxy] solicitation’ and that
‘the validity of proxies provided in response to that solicitation may be in
question.’”97 Several Chugach Alaska shareholders filed complaints with
the Division shortly after receiving the letter, alleging that the letter
contained false and misleading statements.98 The Division requested the
corporation send a clarifying letter, which the corporation did send.99
In the superior court, the “jury heard considerable evidence
clarifying the concerns about the late-bird letter” before deciding that
Henrichs breached his fiduciary duty by authorizing a false and
misleading statement and awarding damages to the corporation.100 On
91. See Complaint, Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Henrichs, No. 3AN-05-10182
Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2005) (alleging false and misleading proxy
solicitation by corporation against its chairman); see also Complaint, Henrichs v.
Chugach Alaska Corp., No. 3AN-05-11014 Civ. (Alaska Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2005)
(seeking access to corporate records in shareholder election). In addition, the
dueling sides filed five complaints with the Division of Banking, Securities, and
Corporations between June 24, 2004, and October 20, 2004. Chugach Alaska Corp.,
Order No. 05-02S (Alaska Dep’t of Com., Cmty., & Econ. Dev. Mar. 9, 2005),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/3/pub/enforcementactions/
05-02-SChugachAKCorp2005.pdf.
92. Dobbyn, supra note 2.
93. 250 P.3d 531 (Alaska 2011).
94. Id. at 533.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 534.
97. Id. (alterations in original).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 534–35.
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appeal, Henrichs argued that “his decision to issue the late-bird proxy
solicitation letter was protected by the business judgment rule and
therefore he could only be held liable if found grossly negligent.”101 The
Alaska Supreme Court began by rejecting Henrichs’ argument that the
business judgment rule applied “unless he was grossly negligent,” noting
that the court “ha[d] never adopted the gross negligence standard as the
measure of the business judgment rule’s protection.”102 Turning to
application of the rule, the court held that because the superior court
found “volitional conduct, including that Henrichs ‘knew and understood
that he was pushing the boundaries of the applicable rules and
regulations,’” it was appropriate for the superior court to reject a
proposed jury instruction on the business judgment rule.103 This ruling
included the important distinction for application of the business
judgment rule, since that rule broadly protects actions taken by directors
under Alaska law.104
In the second case, Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corp. (“Henrichs II”),105
three former directors argued that Chugach’s proxy statement should
have included their names and information despite the board not
including the three in its slate of candidates.106 The court affirmed the
superior court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Chugach.107 The
court held that there was no basis for requiring Chugach to include the
former directors’ names because “the board did not nominate them” and
“because their terms were scheduled to expire and therefore would not
‘continue after the shareholders’ meeting.’”108
The court also affirmed the superior court’s order granting summary
judgment to Chugach on several other claims regarding the proxy
statement.109 First, it rejected Henrichs’ argument that the proxy was
flawed because it did not disclose the compensation of the chairman and
other directors, noting that the “proxy regulations do require a statement
of the individual compensation for the five most highly compensated
officers” and that Chugach’s proxy did just that.110
Next, the court rejected Henrichs’ claim that the proxy statement was

101. Id. at 535.
102. Id. at 538.
103. Id. at 539 (citation omitted).
104. See id. at 537 (“[O]ur caselaw has embodied a high degree of judicial
deference to good faith corporate decision making.”).
105. 260 P.3d 1036 (Alaska 2011).
106. Id. at 1044.
107. Id. at 1046.
108. Id. (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.345(b)(1) (2021)).
109. See id. at 1039–40.
110. Id. at 1044.
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flawed because it “did not state the net value per share of stock.”111 The
court found that Chugach’s proxy “provided equivalent information[,]”
including the number of shares outstanding and the total shareholders’
equity.112
Finally, the court held that Chugach’s early bird prizes to encourage
shareholder participation in the annual meeting by returning proxies
early were not illegal distributions nor were they “vote buying.”113
3. The CIRI Cases
A few years after the Chugach cases, in Rude v. Cook Inlet Region,
Inc.,114 CIRI and its shareholders became involved in proxy litigation
which included themes similar to those of the Chugach cases, including
allegations of materially misleading proxy materials.115 The case involved
then-CIRI director Robert Rude. Mr. Rude formed an independent slate
with three other candidates called the “New Alliance” and issued proxy
materials in the 2008 CIRI director election.116 While CIRI’s election rules
allowed candidates not on the board’s slate to include their information
in the company’s election proxy materials, the New Alliance candidates
chose not to be included.117 CIRI sued the New Alliance, claiming that its
“proxy materials contained materially misleading statements.”118 The
New Alliance statements CIRI objected to addressed “management
compensation, allegations that CIRI had ‘liquidated’ or sold significant
landholdings, shareholders’ rights under Alaska law and ANCSA, CIRI’s
election procedures, and CIRI’s dividend policy.”119 The superior court
concluded that each New Alliance statement was a misrepresentation and
because “New Alliance’s proxy materials were sufficiently ‘egregious,’
the proxies given to New Alliance ‘must be declared void.’”120
The court also addressed, among several issues, the timing of the
proxy solicitation by CIRI.121 In an uncommon ANCSA election
procedure, CIRI had begun its proxy solicitation one week before a
second solicitation proxy mailing which included the company’s annual
report to shareholders.122 Of note, Alaska regulations governing proxy

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1044–45.
294 P.3d 76 (Alaska 2012).
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 83.
See id. at 90–91.
See id. at 81.

39.1 SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

ANCSA CORPORATIONS PROXY WARS

5/2/2022 5:53 PM

65

solicitations require that “solicitation of proxies on behalf of the board for
an annual meeting must be preceded or accompanied by the annual
report for the corporation’s last fiscal year.”123 The superior court, relying
upon an exception within the regulation, ruled that CIRI was responding
to the New Alliance solicitation and the annual report was not available
at the time of the first solicitation based on a sworn affidavit of a CIRI
executive.124 The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting “Rude’s bare
assertion that CIRI could have completed its financial report within
approximately 20 days of the completion of the independent auditor’s
report.”125
The court next addressed the question of whether an ANCSA
corporation must include information regarding a non-board shareholder
proposal in the corporation’s proxy statement under title three of the
Alaska Administrative Code section 08.345(b)(15).126 This issue arose after
the New Alliance proposed a special dividend and claimed that CIRI
should have included information in its company proxy about the
proposal.127 The court applied a “deferential standard of review” given
that the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities was interpreting its
own regulation.128 In rejecting Rude’s interpretation, the court noted that
the agency had previously issued a letter to CIRI that “stated that ‘[t]he
regulations do not require a corporation to include a shareholder’s
resolution in its proxy statement and proxy.’”129
Finally, the court addressed whether an ANCSA corporation was
obligated to “include non-board-nominated candidates . . . in its
proxies.”130 Rude claimed that despite New Alliance choosing to not have
its individual candidate information included in the proxy materials
under CIRI’s election rules, CIRI’s “proxy statement and voter guide
[improperly] failed to disclose the names of all candidates running for the
board and . . . failed to disclose that Rude was a member of the board of
directors running for re-election.”131 Citing the court’s Henrichs II decision
from a year earlier, the court again held that “corporations are not
required to include in their proxy statements the names of non-board-

123. Id. at 83 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.345(a) (2021)).
124. Id. at 83, 91.
125. Id. at 91.
126. See id. at 91–92.
127. See id. at 80, 91–92.
128. Id. at 92 (quoting Handley v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 838 P.2d 1231, 1233
(Alaska 1992)).
129. Id. (quoting letter from Ellen Buchanan, Sec. Exam’r, Alaska Div. of
Banking & Sec. (2004)).
130. Id. at 89.
131. Id. at 83–84.
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nominated candidates or non-continuing directors.”132
The long-running dispute between CIRI and its former directors
Robert Rude and Harold Rudolph continued in Cook Inlet Region, Inc. v.
Rude.133 In that case, Rude and Rudolph had solicited shareholder
signatures for two petitions.134 One petition would have removed the
ANCSA restrictions against the alienability of CIRI stock.135 The other
“sought to convene a special shareholder meeting to consider six advisory
resolutions concerning dividends, elections, financial reporting, voting
rights, and compensation of senior management.”136 The Ninth Circuit
decision addressed whether the District Court had federal question
jurisdiction.137
The ANCSA provision at issue, regarding shareholder petitions for
amending articles of incorporation, incorporates “[t]he requirements of
the laws of the State relating to the solicitation of proxies” for the
“solicitation of signatures for a [shareholder] petition.”138 CIRI “alleged
that defendants’ solicitation materials for the petitions contained false and
materially misleading statements, in violation of Alaska law.”139 The court
held that this was not a basis for federal court jurisdiction as “[CIRI]
brought a federal law claim under a provision of ANCSA that
incorporated state law. [CIRI] did not bring, and indeed could not have
brought, a claim directly under Alaska law because the relevant provision
of Alaska law governs proxy solicitations rather than shareholder
petitions.”140
Regardless, the court held that federal courts have federal question
jurisdiction over interpretation of the ANCSA provision, noting that
“[n]either of [CIRI’s] ANCSA claims was frivolous” nor
“insubstantial.”141 This conclusion highlights one unique aspect of
ANCSA and ANCSA corporations: they are state-chartered and largely
regulated by state agencies, but because of the extensive federal statute
creating ANCSA corporations, the federal courts have federal question
jurisdiction related to many ANCSA issues.142
In yet another case involving the same parties, Rude v. Cook Inlet

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 89–90 (citing Henrichs II, 260 P.3d 1036, 1044 (Alaska 2011)).
690 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1129–30.
Id. at 1130 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1629b(c)(1)(B)).
Id.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id. at 1130.
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Region, Inc.,143 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the issues of proxy
statements and cumulative voting when a candidate withdraws from a
race.144 In this case, former CIRI directors Robert Rude and Harold
Rudolph “distributed a joint proxy statement calling themselves the ‘R&R
Alliance,’” and solicited proxies in the 2010 CIRI election of directors.145
Two days before the annual meeting, Rudolph sent a letter to the
Inspector of Elections to withdraw his candidacy and asked the Inspector
to cumulate all of the R&R proxy votes “which amounted to 27% of the
total, in Rude’s favor. The Inspector split the . . . votes evenly between
Rude and Rudolph, and as a result neither was elected to the Board.”146
Rude claimed in his lawsuit that the Inspector unlawfully refused to
allow him to cumulate the votes on the proxy shared with Rudolph.147
The court noted that Alaska has an ANCSA corporation proxy regulation
allowing for discretionary authority to cumulate which “implies that a
proxy must explicitly ‘confer’ the ‘discretionary authority to cumulate
votes.’”148 In reviewing the R&R proxy, the court found that the
“language of the proxy . . . suggested that the shareholder’s votes would
be equally distributed between the candidates unless otherwise indicated
on the face of the proxy.”149 The court held that the Inspector properly
voted the proxies equally.150
4. The Huna Totem Case
The creation of an ANCSA settlement trust served as a factual
backdrop for a proxy fight in Skaflestad v. Huna Totem Corp.151 There, the
Alaska Supreme Court again addressed allegations of materially
misleading proxy information.152 The Huna Totem board of directors
“grew interested in the idea of establishing a settlement trust” after
receiving “$35 million in unrestricted cash in 1994.”153 Several years after
the shareholders approved creation of the trust, several shareholders
sued, seeking to terminate the trust alleging that the information
provided to shareholders was false and misleading.154 The plaintiffs
focused on a “preliminary packet of information provided to

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

322 P.3d 853 (Alaska 2014).
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.335(g) (2013)).
Id.
Id.
76 P.3d 391 (Alaska 2003).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 392–93.
See id. at 393.
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shareholders in May 1994,” several months before Huna Totem sent its
shareholders a “formal proxy solicitation.”155
The court noted “a two-fold analysis applies to misrepresentation
issues in proxy solicitation cases” that begins with “whether any
statements amounted to misrepresentations” and then requires
determining whether “those misrepresentations are material.”156 Turning
to the facts of the case, the court rejected the shareholders’ focus on “Huna
Totem’s preliminary information” packet.157 The court concluded Huna
Totem’s proxy solicitation “provided each shareholder a complete and
accurate summary of the propos[al]” and that a “reasonable shareholder
considering the information actually provided” would not have been
misled by the somewhat ambiguous and incomplete information
contained in the preliminary information packet.158 The Huna Totem
decision provides ANCSA corporations important guidance regarding
how they provide proxy solicitation information to shareholders; that
they can summarize complex proposals and provide information in
stages.159
B. Adequacy of Proxy Statements
In Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc.,160 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the
adequacy of the proxy statement issued by an ANCSA village corporation
attempting to issue additional shares to elder shareholders without
consideration.161 There, Sierra “assert[ed] that Goldbelt violated 43 U.S.C.
§ 1629b(b)(2)(A) because the proxy statement did not set forth the text of
the proposed amendment or the board’s resolution.”162 An evenly
divided Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of
summary judgment to Goldbelt.163 Two of the justices concluded that a
summary of the proposed changes was adequate to satisfy the proxy
statement disclosure requirements.164 The two other justices “would
[have held] that the proxy statement did not satisfy § 1629b(b)(2)(A)
because it did not ‘set forth’ the board’s resolution.”165 The evenly split
155. Id. at 394.
156. Id. at 395.
157. Id. at 397.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. 25 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2001).
161. Id. at 698.
162. Id. at 703.
163. Id. at 704.
164. See id.; cf. Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 429 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
proxy materials are not false and misleading because they disclose a financial fact
as a lump sum rather than as a cost per share).
165. Sierra, 25 P.3d at 704.
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vote in this decision leaves somewhat open the question of whether
ANCSA corporations must set forth in their proxy materials the full text
of proposed amendments that they take to a shareholder vote. A
conservative approach for ANCSA corporations approaching a similar
issue would be to provide the full text of the proposed amendment, or
board resolution, in the proxy materials.
C. Alaska Division of Banking and Securities Cases & ANCSA
Election Judges
The courts are not the only place that proxy fights occur. Alaska’s
Division of Banking and Securities also addresses complaints of proxy
violations.166 In a 2012 report, the Government Accountability Office
noted “from 1978 through 2011, the state issued administrative orders in
at least 29 investigations of a regional corporation’s or a regional
corporation shareholder’s compliance with the state’s proxy regulations.
Six of the investigations involved a regional corporation’s board
solicitation, and 22 were related to shareholder solicitations.”167
Sometimes these proxy fights have ended in litigation;168 sometimes the
proxy complaints have ended with the decision of the Division.169
In re Sitnasuak Native Corporation170 is an example of the latter. There,
the Alaska Division of Banking and Securities addressed a proxy
disclosure related to a board proxy solicitation.171 Sitnasuak, an ANCSA
village corporation, solicited proxies in its annual election but failed to
disclose the employment of one of its board candidates in its proxy
statement, despite the candidate disclosing the information in her board
candidate questionnaire.172 The corporation repeated its omission in the
166. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 08.360 (2021) (providing for
investigations of alleged proxy violations); see also id. § 08.930 (providing
hearings).
167. GAO-13-121, supra note 14, at 36 (footnotes omitted); see also Enforcement
Orders, ALASKA DEP’T OF COM., CMTY., & ECON. DEV., DIV. OF BANKING & SEC.,
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/dbs/enforcementorders.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 30, 2022) (indexing enforcement orders, including those of ANCSA
proxy decisions from the present back to 1971).
168. See, e.g., Brown v. Dick, 107 P.3d 260 (Alaska 2005).
169. See, e.g., Salvato, Ord. No. 19-38-S (Alaska Dep’t of Com., Cmty., & Econ.
Dev., Div. of Banking & Sec. Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/portals/3/pub/Notice%20Order%20
19-38-S.pdf.
170. Sitnasuak Native Corp., Ord. No. 15-1531-S (Alaska Dep’t of Com., Cmty.,
& Econ. Dev., Div. of Banking & Sec. Feb. 9, 2016),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/3/pub/enforcementactions/
15-1531-S-FinalOrder.pdf.
171. Id. at 1–2.
172. Id. at 2.
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subsequent year after the then-seated board member again disclosed her
employment.173 The Administrator concluded that Sitnasuak “violated 3
AAC [§] 08.345(b)(1)(F) by failing to disclose Ms. Sobocienski’s
employment as Chief Executive Officer of Deloycheet, Inc. from 2010-2012
in its 2014 and 2015 Notice of Annual Meeting & Proxy Statements.”174
A recent example of a court case arising alongside a complaint at the
Division involved the Calista Corporation election in 2018.175 In Calista
Corp. v. Don, the Alaska Superior Court addressed proxy solicitation in
the context of a request for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.176 The case arose in the context of “[a]ccusations of sexual
harassment . . . that pit[ted] the company’s chief executive and board of
directors against its now-removed chairman.”177
The court denied Calista’s motion finding that “none [of the
evidence presented] shows that any of the defendants requested, sought,
or obtained either a proxy or the revocation of a proxy.”178 The court
rejected Calista’s argument that the defendants’ criticism of the company,
even when close in time to the corporate election, constituted proxy
solicitation:
[c]riticism of corporate conduct that is communicated to
shareholders indirectly, through a public statement or news
interview, and . . . does not expressly or impliedly seek a proxy
or to revoke a proxy . . . is not, in this court’s opinion, actionable
as a false or misleading proxy solicitation.179
The court noted that it was “a closer question” regarding defendant
Harley Sundown’s “Facebook postings” where “he explicitly calls for
‘fellow Yupics’ to vote out board member Robert Beans.”180 The court
explained that “[g]eneral criticism of the board’s actions cannot
reasonably be construed as directing the shareholders to vote a particular

173. Id. at 2–3.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Calista Corp. v. Don, No. 3AN-18-6788 (Alaska Super. Ct. 3d Dist. June 4,
2018).
176. Id. slip op. at 1.
177. Nathaniel Herz, Court Filings Expose Power Struggle Over Sex Harassment
Charges at Alaska Native Corporation Calista, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2018),
https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/rural-alaska/2018/06/07/court-filingsexpose-power-struggle-over-sex-harassment-charges-at-native-corporationcalista/.
178. Calista Corp., slip op. at 2.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id. The court found in the alternative that the action against Sundown
would fail because “Civil Rule 3(c) would require the action against defendant
Sundown to be brought in the Fourth Judicial District at Bethel.” Id.
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way. . . . If it did, absurd results would abound . . . .”181 The case settled
before trial.182
In a companion case at the Alaska Division of Banking and
Securities, the Director reviewed “a series of posts to [Harley Sundown’s]
Facebook account.”183 The Director found that the respondent violated the
proxy regulations because the Facebook posts were proxy statements and
Mr. Sundown had not filed “his proxy statement concurrently with the
Administrator when he distributed it to shareholders.”184
While election issues are sometimes raised and decided at the
Division, the rulings of corporations’ election judges can also be the
genesis of proxy disputes. In Undersigned Shareholders of the Cape Fox Corp.
v. Cape Fox Corp.,185 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed an election issue
and the rulings of the corporation’s election judge.186 The dispute arose
after shareholders became concerned about the management of a
corporation-owned store named The Village Store and an alleged “‘coverup’ regarding lost money and inventory form the store.”187 Twenty-four
shareholders “sued the corporation to contest the results of its annual
election.”188 An outside attorney acting as the election judge had

181. Id.
182. Legal Disagreements Amicably Resolved Between Calista and Director Don,
DELTA DISCOVERY (Feb. 13, 2019), https://deltadiscovery.com/legaldisagreements-amicably-resolved-between-calista-and-director-don/.
183. Harley Sundown, Ord. No. 18-161-S, at 2 (Alaska Dep’t of Com., Cmty.,
& Econ. Dev., Div. of Banking & Sec. Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/portals/3/pub/Consent%20Order%2
018-161-S.pdf.
184. Id. at 3; see also William Andrews, Ord. No. 19-123-S, at 2–3 (Alaska Dep’t
of Com., Cmty., & Econ. Dev., Div. of Banking & Sec. Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/portals/3/pub/Order%2019-123S.pdf (concluding “Facebook posts are proxy statements” and failing to file them
is a violation); Jacob Resneck, For Alaska Native Shareholders, Criticism on Facebook
During Board Elections Can Trigger State Fines, COASTALASKA – JUNEAU (Jan. 14,
2020), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/01/14/for-alaska-nativeshareholders-critical-facebook-talk-during-board-elections-can-mean-a-statefine/ (noting that the Division of Banking & Securities fined a Sealaska Corp.
shareholder for moderating a Facebook forum where some of the postings were
deemed proxy solicitations); Regulators Fine Native Corporation Board Member Over
Social
Media
Post,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS
(July
15,
2020),
https://www.adn.com/business-economy/2020/07/15/regulators-fine-nativecorporation-board-member-over-social-media-post/ (detailing the Division of
Banking & Securities’ decision to fine a board member whose Facebook post
implied payments for shareholders who voted a certain way).
185. No. S-8966, 2000 WL 34545821 (Alaska Aug. 30, 2000).
186. Id. at *1.
187. Id. The store is not named in Undersigned Shareholders but is named in
Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp., 113 P.3d 1226, 1228 (Alaska 2005) and Shields v. Cape
Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1085 (Alaska 2002).
188. Undersigned Shareholders, 2000 WL 34545821 at *1.
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disallowed “proxy votes proffered for two unsuccessful candidates” for
the board of directors.189
In the case of the first candidate, the election judge had ruled that the
candidate had distributed a letter that “was a proxy statement under 3
[AAC §] 09.355(14).”190 The election judge then invalidated all of the
candidate’s proxy votes because the letter “contained a seriously
misleading omission.”191 The election judge invalidated the proxies for
the second candidate because she “had failed to distribute a written proxy
statement, in violation of 3 AAC [§] 08.355.”192
The superior court granted summary judgment to Cape Fox after
concluding that neither candidate “had received enough votes to be
elected a Cape Fox director, even if the proxies directing votes to be cast
in their favor were valid.”193 The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that “[t]he superior court was not required to declare the validity of the
proxies when the outcome of that issue would not have changed the
outcome of the election.”194
When studying proxy issues, it is important to note that the Alaska
Division of Banking and Securities has jurisdiction over proxy complaints
and has addressed dozens of cases over the past fifty years.195 Some of
these cases also involve litigation in the courts, but many do not.
D. The Last Word (and Emerging Issues) – Ahmasuk v. State
The Alaska Supreme Court, in an opinion issued in 2021, addressed
the tension between First Amendment rights and proxy solicitation
regulations in Ahmasuk v. State.196 Ahmasuk, a shareholder of Sitnasuak
Corporation, wrote a letter to the editor of The Nome Nugget outside of the
corporation’s annual election cycle decrying discretionary proxy
voting.197 The corporation filed a complaint with the Division of
Corporations because Ahmasuk had not filed the letter with the

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *2.
194. Id. Two other cases addressing aspects of corporate governance, but not
proxy issues, arose from the same facts at issue in Undersigned Shareholders. See
Martinez v. Cape Fox Corp., 113 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2005) (addressing the removal
of directors and bans on directors based on misconduct); Shields v. Cape Fox
Corp., 42 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2002) (addressing removal of directors for fraud, gross
neglect, or gross abuse of authority).
195. See GAO-13-121, supra note 14, at 34-36.
196. 478 P.3d 665 (Alaska 2021).
197. See id. at 669–70.
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Division.198 The Division found the letter to be a proxy solicitation and
fined Ahmasuk.199 Ahmasuk, claiming the Division’s proxy regulations
infringed on his First Amendment Rights, appealed to the Superior Court,
which affirmed the Division.200 Ahmasuk appealed again.201
The Alaska Supreme Court defined the question on appeal as
“whether the Division’s interpretation and application of its definition of
‘solicitation,’ as it relates to the definition of ‘proxy,’ is reasonable under
the facts and circumstances of this case.”202 Importantly, it reached its
conclusion and reversed the superior court’s decision “[w]ithout reaching
the constitutional issues Ahmasuk rais[ed].”203
The Court reviewed the history of a similar federal Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation addressing proxy solicitations,
which the SEC expanded in 1956 to “include ‘furnishing of a form of
proxy or other communication to security holders under circumstances
reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding, or
revocation of a proxy.’”204 The court noted that title three of Alaska
Administrative Code section 08.365(16) is “essentially . . . a parallel
provision,”205 but that the SEC later narrowed the definition of solicitation
because the rules “created unnecessary regulatory impediments to
communication among shareholders and others.”206 The court concluded
that it “share[d] similar concerns . . . , namely that the Division’s broad
regulatory interpretation contravenes the proxy regulations’ purposes
and stifles corporate governance debate.”207

III. CONCLUSION
Since Congress chose a corporate form for Alaska Natives in
ANCSA, Alaska Native Corporations and their shareholders have
periodically fought proxy wars before Alaska’s regulating agency and in
the courts. These cases have commonly involved allegations of false and
198. Id. at 666.
199. Ahmasuk, Ord. No. 17-49-S (Alaska Dep’t of Com., Cmty., & Econ. Dev.,
Div. of Banking & Sec. March 13, 2017),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/3/pub/enforcementactions/
17-49-S_AustinAhmasuk.pdf?ver=2017-03-13-152421-330.
200. Ahmasuk, 478 P.3d at 671–72.
201. Id. at 666.
202. Id. at 673.
203. Id. at 679.
204. Id. at 676 (quoting Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-5276, 1956 WL 7757 (Jan. 17, 1956)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 677 (quoting Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders,
57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, at 48,277 (Oct. 22, 1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249)).
207. Id. at 677.
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misleading proxy statements, failures to make required proxy statement
disclosures, and challenges to the rulings of inspectors of election or
election judges. Alaska’s courts have addressed many aspects of these
common issues establishing clear precedent. The state has also updated
and modernized its regulations several times, although it was slow to
react to changing forums like social media. New issues continue to arise,
however, including the tension between the First Amendment and proxy
regulations and the regulation of social media. Through the decades since
the creation of ANCSA corporations, one constant has been the
persistence of proxy wars tied to the annual elections of directors.

